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gatherings, but mixed with blessings,—not to be credited to the conductors of the war, but to those who can bring good out of evil. Whether these gains will balance the losses, we will see in another paper.

GREEN MOUNTAINS.

THE EASTERN WAR:

SOME ENGLISH VIEWS OF ITS LOSSES AND GAINS.

A GLIMPSE OF ITS LOSSES.—It is difficult to estimate, with any approach to accuracy, the amount of injury of various kinds that Europe has sustained during the recent conflict. So far back as June, 1855, Mr. Gladstone computed the number of lives lost at that time as little less than half a million. "If we have then," he said, "15,000 English, between 30,000 and 40,000 French, and 120,000 Turks, numbered among the dead as the consequence of this war, it is no consolation to think that 250,000 Russians have been killed. The total number of the slain is nearly half a million; so that during this war, on an average, the lives of 1,000 of our fellow creatures have been extinguished daily." But this, it must be remembered, was before the fall of Kars, and the sanguinary skirmishes, battles and assaults that preceded it. And above all, it was before the fearful and wholesale butcheries of the Malakoff and Redan, and the destructive bombardment which led to the capture of Sebastopol. We have seen it recently stated, on Russian authority, that during the few days of that bombardment, they lost 30,000 men. Altogether, it can hardly be deemed an exaggeration, if we put down the total number destroyed during the war at 700,000 human beings. How much of suffering these figures represent—how much of horrible physical agony, inflicted by every form of injury and mutilation of which the human frame is susceptible, and the still worse, because more protracted, torments of cold, famine and pining disease—how much of secret mental anguish endured by the poor victims, dying in terror and solitude, without the solace of domestic love, or the support of religious consolation—how much of sharp and prolonged torture borne by affectionate hearts at home, while held for months and years in distracting suspense as to the fate of the sufferers—how much of black and terrible despair, quenching the very light of life in hundreds of desolate homes, when the decisive tidings of death came! What an aggregate of agony all this represents what imagination can conceive!

And as to the cost in money, that must have been enormous. On this subject a correspondent of the *Independence Belge* makes the following statement:—England, deducting the ordinary war-budget, has thrown into the struggle 100 millions sterling in loans and additional taxes. France has been obliged to expend 1,500 million francs, or 60 millions sterling, over and above her extraordinary war-budget. As regards Turkey, an outlay of nearly 5 millions is known; but that must be a very small portion of her losses. It is well known that Russia has borrowed 21 millions sterling, without speaking of the exhaustion of all her financial resources. Austria, by merely keeping her armies on a war-footing, has expended the almost incredible sum of £45,000,000. Adding the extra expenses incurred by Prussia to meet eventualities, and the expenditure of Piedmont, he makes the total amount to be 280 millions sterling. But it is clear at a glance that some at least of these figures are greatly under-rated. It is ridiculous to compute the cost of the war to Turkey at only 5 millions, and equally so that

of Russia at 21 millions. It is true that our Chancellor of the Exchequer has attempted to show that our proportion is not so large as is here set down. But this is done by a mere sleight of hand. We have not the smallest doubt, that, if we include all the sums expended from the first preparations for the war, to the final subsidence of our budget to its normal condition, it will be found that 100 millions will not nearly cover the outlay.

Such are the direct losses in men and money. But by what standard shall we measure the indirect mischiefs it has inflicted on the material interests of Europe—in the interruption of commerce—in the depreciation of public securities—in the enormous increase in the price of provisions? And above all, who shall compute the incalculable moral damage we have suffered, in the degrading and brutalizing process that has been carried on upon myriads of human hearts, which it will require many years to counteract and retrieve?

SOME OF ITS ALLEGED GAINS.—Now, what have we gained as a counterpoise for these prodigious sacrifices? Has Europe acquired any advantage on the side of liberty? The question itself sounds like bitter irony. What have become of the hopes of Polish, Hungarian and Italian independence, so confidently cherished by men of generous sympathies, but of no very sagacious judgments, and which lent so much of enthusiasm to their advocacy of the war? Withered like the autumn leaves. It is not merely, let it be observed, that those hopes have utterly failed of accomplishment, but that the condition of the countries in question, so far as their political emancipation is concerned, is far worse than it was before, and that as the direct consequence of the war, which was hailed as the means of their deliverance. In regard to Poland, so completely have the great governments recognized its political absorption as having become a part of the permanent settlement of Europe, that even England and France, who had hitherto been wont to keep up a sham protest in its favor, did not once mention the name in the Peace Conferences. And some of the liberal journals of this country, we observe, who up to this time had clung to its cause, in faint expectation that something in the chapter of accidents might occur to throw light on its destiny, now abandon it in final despair, and recommend the Poles to give heed to the stern counsel lately addressed to them by the Emperor of Russia, and "*cherish no more illusions.*" As for Hungary, we need only listen to the tones of profound and melancholy despondency, in which its great chief and champion has spoken of its prospects, as affected by the course and conclusions of the late war; while Italy is more completely and helplessly prostrate beneath the foot of despotism than it has been before, England and France having entered into a secret treaty with Austria, which not only adds to its European prestige by the sanction of so high an alliance, but, beyond all doubt, involves a virtual acknowledgement of its rights over Hungary and Italy, and all its other subject provinces.

But this is not all. In every sense and in every direction, we contend that the interests of European liberty have been damaged by the war. Whom has it most signally profited? Whose position has it strengthened at home? Whose influence has it rendered predominant in Europe? Beyond all doubt, those of Napoleon III. And without saying one syllable against this enigmatic personage, who, from having been overwhelmed only three years ago with every conceivable outrage and insult, and been branded a bandit and a monster, has, without the slightest change in his own policy, become so prodigious a favorite with England, we may yet be permitted to ask, not meaning any offence to the Alliance, in what respect *his* ascendancy is likely to subserve the cause of liberty, either at home or abroad? We are sometimes told, indeed, that Germany and Central Europe have experienced a great deliverance by the destruction of the overshadowing spell of Russian invincibility, which paralysed their aspirations after freedom.

The reply to that is, that the spell in question was the merest fiction that ever existed. For when, in 1848 and 1849, the people of Germany arose to assert their liberties, no attempt was ever made by Russia to put them down. Even while the democracy had triumphant possession of Vienna and Berlin, and Dresden and Munich, no Russian intervention menaced these capitals. And if the projects of German freedom proved to be shameful abortions, it was owing to the perfidy of their own Princes, and, to speak the honest truth, the utter incapacity displayed by the people themselves to turn to wise and safe uses the advantages they had gained. And what is it that at this moment binds all Europe in chains? What is it that keeps it like a huge giant pinioned and prostrate, utterly unable to make use of its great strength to effect its own liberation? What but the enormous military power, ever the slavish instrument of despotism, to whose predominance the recent war has added immensely, not only in numbers, but still more in influence, by the halo of glory and admiration which it has thrown around the profession of arms. We have dwelt at some length on this point, because everybody will remember, except those who are anxious to forget, that nothing whatever so much contributed to the popularity of the war among the masses of the people, as the expectation that it was going in some way to subserve the cause of European liberty. Never was there a delusion so complete.

But let us now turn to another aspect of the question, and inquire how far the specific objects assigned for the war by statesmen and diplomatists have been secured. The one primary end, always put forward in its justification, was to maintain the integrity and independence of the Turkish empire. The means by which this end was to be attained were twofold. First, the erection of an insurmountable barrier between Turkey and the powerful and ambitious neighbor, who, it was assumed, designed to swallow her up. Secondly, the introduction of such domestic reforms as would regenerate Turkey herself, and save her from the internal dissolution which threatened her even more imminently than external aggressions. Let us see, then, whether we have gained these objects, for the sake of which, we were told, it was worth while to make any exertions and sacrifices, however exhaustive.

Let it be borne in mind, that the security that was deemed indispensable for Turkey against Russian encroachment, was an absolute material guarantee, that is, some provision that would render it physically impossible for the latter to assail the former. Promises and engagements, embodied in treaties with whatever solemnity, were declared to be utterly worthless. Russian promises were like the *Punica fides*, nothing better than a mockery, a delusion and a snare. Well, then, with this idea in our mind, let us turn to the articles of peace; and what do we find? We find that on the Asiatic side no change whatever is to be made. All the forts on the eastern coast of the Black Sea are to be erected, and the right of Russia to her conquered Circassian provinces are virtually and for the first time recognized by the Western Powers. So far the *status quo ante bellum* is restored, or, if there is any change, it is in a sense favorable to Russia, and unfavorable to Turkey.

But then, we are told that the Ottoman Empire is rescued from the perpetual menace to which it was exposed from the other side from that notable diplomatic device, known as "the neutralization of the Black Sea." But how is that secured? We will describe it in words borrowed from the *Morning Star*:—"Russia is not at liberty to have any large ships of war in the Euxine, Turkey pledging herself also to the same self-denying ordinance. Yet by the special convention between her and the Porte, she may have six steam-vessels of 600 tons each, and four smaller vessels of 400 tons. She may have any number she pleases of armed transports; for though Lord Clarendon, in the first instance, objected to their being armed, that point

was at length virtually conceded to the Russian Plenipotentiaries. Nicolaieff is expressly excluded from the operation of the article which forbids Russia having military-maritime arsenals, and there seems to be no security whatever beyond the bare promise of Count Orloff, that it may not be made as formidable a place as Sebastopol. It would appear, indeed, that even the latter is to be permanently closed against British ships." Now, we entreat our readers' attention for a moment. Let it be remembered that during the preliminary negotiations which preceded the war, the Emperor of Russia repeatedly, and in the most solemn and emphatic manner, declared his full intention sacredly to respect the integrity of Turkey, and on the acceptance of the Vienna Note, had already prepared his order for the evacuation of the Principalities by his troops. Nay more, he, in a manner perfectly spontaneous and unsolicited, made a voluntary engagement to that effect with our Government, and caused a written memorandum to be drawn up, in which he says, "I beg you to understand that what I have pledged myself to, will be equally binding upon my successor." And there can be little doubt, we think, that if it had been deemed necessary, he would have entered into a formal treaty to the same effect.

But then, we were told that a treaty was a mere piece of paper; that we must have some better guarantee than that for the security of Turkey. Rather than accept the solemn engagements of Russia, we went to war, which cost some 700,000 human lives, and some 300 millions of money, and at the end of it, we obtain as security for Turkey—what? Why a treaty! the promises of the Emperor of Russia and Count Orloff, and absolutely nothing else! Mr. Layard, who declared himself satisfied with the Treaty of Peace, adverting to the clause which limits the number and size of the vessels to be kept by Russia in the Black Sea, uses these words, "*If Russia adhered to that stipulation, there would be no fear of the result of this treaty. But, in reality, this clause of the treaty was of very little importance, because there were a thousand ways in which Russia might evade the terms of the treaty.*" Large ships had been proved in this war of very little advantage. Now, there was nothing in the treaty to prevent Russia from having a swarm of small boats in the Black Sea." So, also, Lord John Russell:—"No doubt Russia can have a number of gun-boats, unarmed, or even steamers, which, although built for commercial purposes, might be adapted for purposes of war." But the language of Lord Palmerston is still more remarkable. Alluding to the engagements of Russia in regard to the limitation of their naval force, and Count Orloff's promise respecting Nicolaieff, he says:—"When it is said the promises are mere words, and that Russia may in secrecy, or by violating her promises, collect in her rivers or in the Sea of Azoff, a larger force, it only comes to this—that every treaty is liable to be evaded or violated by the bad faith of the party with whom you contract it. If you can not rely upon the good faith of nations with whom you make treaties, then you are reduced to the alternative of making all wars a *Tou-ranee*. There can be no peace without extermination." True enough; but then the very ground on which you entered upon the bloody and desolating war you have just closed by treaty, was the assumption that you "could not rely upon the good faith" of Russia. Without that assumption you need not have gone to war at all; for the Emperor had frequently pledged his honor as a man and a monarch, and was no doubt ready to do so in the most formal manner you could propose, to respect the independence and integrity of Turkey. You laughed to scorn his assurances, and insisted on committing Europe to a desperate conflict, in order to secure some imaginary "material guarantee" for your client. But when the conflict is over, and all its incalculable moral and material mischiefs have been inflicted upon Europe, you make a treaty, for the faithful observance of which you have, according to your own confession no guarantee whatever except that very "good faith" which you had previously so imperiously spurned!—*Herald of Peace.*